Why do people leave home to move to another country? Why do they do this when their transit includes riding on top of a train called La Bestia? (You probably don't have to look up the English translation to figure out what it means.) Why do this when riding on La Bestia might be the safest part of the trip?
People voluntarily uproot themselves, leave their homes and move to another country for only a few reasons: long-term personal safety and security are always among the top reasons, along with pursuing opportunities for education, comfort and wealth. Americans--other than Native Americans--are exclusively either immigrants, or are descendants of immigrants, slaves and others who were forcibly brought here in some indentured manner; most of us have American pedigrees that originate within the last three hundred years, a relatively short time span in the great scheme of things that we call civilization.
Despite this history, the American consciousness--including especially our politics--has occasionally been obsessed with an almost hysterical fear that our country is being overwhelmed with outsiders who are--for purposes of this controversy--lumped together as "illegal immigrants." Now is one of those occasions.
Leaving aside for the moment the inherent absurdity that a nation based on the pedigree of immigration can be overwhelmed by any number or type of additional immigrants--out of a current population of 315 millions, the undocumented or illegal population numbers about 11 millions, or roughly 3.5% of the total--let's focus only on the immediate "crisis" at hand, which is described as the illicit arrival--many via La Bestia--over the last almost a year of 57,000 illegally-immigrated minors (children) from Central America. That's right: children riding on top of La Bestia.
Here's something that might come as a surprise to most people: these 57,000 are not necessarily "illegals." Almost certainly some are, but with equal certainty some--perhaps the majority--are not.
Granted, 57,000 people in one place at one time can be a lot of people. But we're not talking about all of these people being in one place at one time. They are spread out over a huge geography, and over some significant amount of time. True, more have probably arrived since that number was counted, but some have already been returned to their countries of origin, all of which is a normal state of affairs.
Yes, believe it or not, there is some normalcy in this "crisis" story.
But let's work with that number: 57,000 added to 315 million works out to .02%, which is two one-hundredths of a percent of America's total population. That is a pretty small, almost miniscule, and proportionally insignificant, addition to the nation's count of residents.
Admittedly, managing to a situation such as this costs the country something, some of which was anticipated and therefore planned for. These 57,000 people are seeking asylum in the United States; asylum is a legal status, granted upon judicial review, and it has been around for decades. In particular, a specific law that was adopted by the U.S. six years ago in the waning months of the Bush 2 administration could apply to many of these 57,000 since it was crafted to offer asylum to Central American children who are determined to be at risk of exploitation by gangs and criminals (sometimes organized) in their home countries.
There's a much larger context to asylum than just the current plight of children from Central America. The United States offers asylum for many reasons, and the offers go out to people all over the world. In the years 2003 to 2012, the United States granted asylum to over 250,000 people from more than 100 countries.
During that time period, fewer than 10,000 of those grants of asylum were made to people from all Central American countries combined. Almost the same number of Ethiopians--about 9500--were granted asylum. Over in the Caribbean, Haiti by itself accounted for over 16,000 grants of asylum. China had the most: almost 65,000. (See the New Republic article by Danny Vinik that analyzes asylum data from the U.S. Government, and then presents it in a really nifty interactive map.)
Put all of this together--American history; immigrants being spread out over space and time; the legal and historical context of asylum--and the case for calling this situation a "crisis" is just not convincing. If there is anything of crisis in this, it is a crisis of our morals and ethics; but let's pass on discussion of that, at least for now, because my working assumption is that the great majority of Americans, when confronted with the reality of endangered children, will choose to provide those children with safety instead of returning them to an environment of hostility and criminal compulsion; especially when at least some of the root causes of that criminality emanate from America's own social and legal behaviors towards cocaine, heroin and other drugs.
Nonetheless, working through thousands of asylum-seekers is time-consuming and costly. I don't know what is the "right thing to do" for these people as individuals, because each one will have a different story. But taken together as a group, I know that the legalities of asylum require that due process be provided. America is, after all, a legalistic society. Tedious though that might be at times, it is our adherence to the "rule of law," as we call it, that helps us to build and maintain our leading position among the world's nations.
Additionally, in the current case of the Central American children, it is in the self-interest of law-abiding Americans to do whatever is possible and practical to show them that there are better ways to live than to return to an environment that could make them a part of criminal enterprises supplying illicit and dangerous drugs to the North American market. If we are law-abiding Americans, do we want to encourage young people to pursue criminal lifestyles that ultimately profit from the continuing use and purchase of dangerous drugs in the United States? I think not.
The larger question, of course, is this: Will the United States be welcoming to immigration, or hostile to it? There's a general feeling in this country that we Americans are opposed only to illegal immigration, and welcoming to legal immigration, and that this means that the United States is anything but hostile to immigration. Unfortunately, the whole story is that the U.S. provides immigration visas to only a small fraction of the apparently-qualified applicants, and so because of that fact we therefore severely restrict the number of foreign people who can legally move into the country and seek to become naturalized citizens.
Some will say that this is as it should be because the United States is populous enough as it is. Certainly, the size of the population bears watching, but also consider the nature of that population, and realize that without sustained, large numbers of immigrants--more than the U.S. currently allows in legally--the country faces two undeniable demographic shortcomings: first, large numbers of highly-skilled potential immigrants are denied access to America and therefore go elsewhere, enriching the business and innovation cultures of those other countries instead of doing so in the U.S.; and, second, America's population will age much faster with less immigration than it will with more immigration, which means fewer workers making money, paying taxes and supporting programs like Social Security and Medicare that are vitally important to an older population.
It's true, as some like to say, that a country must be able to control its borders. But the bigger truth is that border control is only a small part of the bigger picture. Is there an immigration crisis? Maybe so, but it's not a crisis of figuring out how to deport 57,000 children as quickly as possible; it's bigger than that.
(Note: this posting is corrected from the original with regard to math errors pointed out by an astute reader. I should have done a better job in proof-reading my own work. Sorry.)
Thursday, August 7, 2014
Friday, August 1, 2014
Israelis and Palestinians today -- King Pyrrhus rides again
Some will read this article and conclude that I am biased, or prejudiced, or pro-Israeli or pro-Palestinian; others will conclude that I am hopelessly naive or ill-informed. In truth, I have a normal set of biases and prejudices, and am both pro-Israeli and pro-Palestinian. As for the hopeless part: there's always something else to learn, and optimism--which is my nature--is much different from naivete.
As I sit down to write this, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and the Hamas armed forces of the Gaza Palestinians have been in armed and bloody conflict for the last three weeks. The total number of deaths is approaching 2000, and it appears that about 90% of those deaths are Palestinian non-combatants. The fundamental cause of the fighting is that the Israelis feel threatened by the animosity and belligerence of the Hamas organization; the Palestinians, for their part, feel threatened by Israel's willingness and ability to destroy and isolate, both with impunity.
It really is that simple.
Yes, of course there are many other facts involved in the present battle; some, perhaps all, of them are important, but all else that can be said, whether factually or emotionally, is derivative of the fundamental causes: each side feels threatened by the other, and for good reason. This is a problem that is now over six decades old, with little or no current hope for resolution.
No outsider--least of all myself--can impose a solution to this problem on the parties involved; they must develop that solution themselves, and they must do it jointly. At the moment, of course, these two sides have no interest in doing anything together.
Make no mistake about the outcome of the current battle: the IDF will win. The rockets and tunnels used by Hamas to threaten Israel will be greatly diminished or eliminated; perhaps even Hamas will be destroyed as a governing and fighting organization. Israel will gain a measure of security, which it deserves; the Israelis will suffer relatively little in order to accomplish this. The Palestinians of Gaza will gain nothing, and will lose much and suffer greatly; they deserve better, but "better" will not happen for them if recent history is any guide.
Similar battles have been fought in recent years between the IDF and Hamas, with similar results. You would think that the leaderships would notice the futility, tragedy and expense of this, and then decide to try something different. In that regard, Israel's government and Hamas share a gruesome bond.
Through its endemic corruptions and ineffectiveness Hamas has utterly failed its constituents of Gaza. By denying Israel's right to existence and security, Hamas also prohibits the development of leadership for the Gazans, since leadership depends upon the ability to recognize reality, and also to recognize that mass hallucinations are eventually overwhelmed by the greater massiveness of reality.
Israel's government, for its part, is equally guilty of ineffective leadership, although in more subtle ways. Its subtly hides an inability to recognize that the future of Israel is one of decline unless it develops a new strategy for living alongside the Palestinians.
The IDF does a good job of winning Israel's battles, but each battle which is won--in a military sense--incurs a greater cost for Israel in larger ways. Not only does the majority of the rest of the world take notice of and deplore the toll of Palestinian non-combatants in these battles, but there is a growing sense that Israel has willfully established itself as overlord of the Palestinians, and yet accepts and fulfills only the most rudimentary responsibilities of overlordship, and does so reluctantly and minimally.
International sentiment is turning away from Israel. This is a great cost for a small country. The IDF wins the battles, but Israel might be losing the war, because the total cost of winning those individual engagements is disproportionally high for the size of the country.
Some twenty-three centuries ago King Pyrrhus had a similar experience. His army fought battles with the Romans and others; the King's forces won those battles, with fewer casualties than their opponents. But the cost to King Pyrrhus, in relative terms, was higher than it was for the other side, and so King Pyrrhus lost the war. (He also lost his life in battle; possibly this happened because he wasn't aware that the greater part of the world--as he knew it--had turned against him.)
The State of Israel deserves to exist in peace and security. Likewise, the Palestinians deserve their own State of Palestine that will exist in peace and security. Both sides deserve leadership that understands and acknowledges that these are fundamental and equal requirements for achieving a peaceful coexistence that is mutually beneficial.
As said above, there's no way to impose a solution from the outside. However, if it were up to me, I would say that the only way to get to a solution is for both sides to be willing to give up something of great value to the other side. Probably the only thing left of value to the Palestinians--certainly the Gazans--is Hamas' intransigence towards Israel's very existence; they should be prepared to give that away, either through an ideological change or by removal of Hamas from the picture (peacefully, I hope, and not brutally). Such an offer would be of existential value to the Israelis.
For Israel's part, its current holding that is of great value to the Palestinians is the ability to nurture an independent Palestinian state, with all the territorial integrity that would come with statehood. Success might require that Israel give up some land that it now occupies. If the current Israeli government can develop enough foresight to see that this would be a small price to pay for existential security, then let them do it; if they cannot develop that foresight, then Israel needs a new government.
A message to the vast majorities of people on both sides in this conflict: Get yourselves some real leadership that thinks in terms of mutual respect and integrity; do so, and over time the feelings of being threatened and being insecure will go away. That means no more fighting, no more killing, no more destruction, no more lingering bitterness and misery. Finding the right kind of leadership might take some real effort, but the long-term benefits will make it all worthwhile.
As I sit down to write this, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and the Hamas armed forces of the Gaza Palestinians have been in armed and bloody conflict for the last three weeks. The total number of deaths is approaching 2000, and it appears that about 90% of those deaths are Palestinian non-combatants. The fundamental cause of the fighting is that the Israelis feel threatened by the animosity and belligerence of the Hamas organization; the Palestinians, for their part, feel threatened by Israel's willingness and ability to destroy and isolate, both with impunity.
It really is that simple.
Yes, of course there are many other facts involved in the present battle; some, perhaps all, of them are important, but all else that can be said, whether factually or emotionally, is derivative of the fundamental causes: each side feels threatened by the other, and for good reason. This is a problem that is now over six decades old, with little or no current hope for resolution.
No outsider--least of all myself--can impose a solution to this problem on the parties involved; they must develop that solution themselves, and they must do it jointly. At the moment, of course, these two sides have no interest in doing anything together.
Make no mistake about the outcome of the current battle: the IDF will win. The rockets and tunnels used by Hamas to threaten Israel will be greatly diminished or eliminated; perhaps even Hamas will be destroyed as a governing and fighting organization. Israel will gain a measure of security, which it deserves; the Israelis will suffer relatively little in order to accomplish this. The Palestinians of Gaza will gain nothing, and will lose much and suffer greatly; they deserve better, but "better" will not happen for them if recent history is any guide.
Similar battles have been fought in recent years between the IDF and Hamas, with similar results. You would think that the leaderships would notice the futility, tragedy and expense of this, and then decide to try something different. In that regard, Israel's government and Hamas share a gruesome bond.
Through its endemic corruptions and ineffectiveness Hamas has utterly failed its constituents of Gaza. By denying Israel's right to existence and security, Hamas also prohibits the development of leadership for the Gazans, since leadership depends upon the ability to recognize reality, and also to recognize that mass hallucinations are eventually overwhelmed by the greater massiveness of reality.
Israel's government, for its part, is equally guilty of ineffective leadership, although in more subtle ways. Its subtly hides an inability to recognize that the future of Israel is one of decline unless it develops a new strategy for living alongside the Palestinians.
The IDF does a good job of winning Israel's battles, but each battle which is won--in a military sense--incurs a greater cost for Israel in larger ways. Not only does the majority of the rest of the world take notice of and deplore the toll of Palestinian non-combatants in these battles, but there is a growing sense that Israel has willfully established itself as overlord of the Palestinians, and yet accepts and fulfills only the most rudimentary responsibilities of overlordship, and does so reluctantly and minimally.
International sentiment is turning away from Israel. This is a great cost for a small country. The IDF wins the battles, but Israel might be losing the war, because the total cost of winning those individual engagements is disproportionally high for the size of the country.
Some twenty-three centuries ago King Pyrrhus had a similar experience. His army fought battles with the Romans and others; the King's forces won those battles, with fewer casualties than their opponents. But the cost to King Pyrrhus, in relative terms, was higher than it was for the other side, and so King Pyrrhus lost the war. (He also lost his life in battle; possibly this happened because he wasn't aware that the greater part of the world--as he knew it--had turned against him.)
The State of Israel deserves to exist in peace and security. Likewise, the Palestinians deserve their own State of Palestine that will exist in peace and security. Both sides deserve leadership that understands and acknowledges that these are fundamental and equal requirements for achieving a peaceful coexistence that is mutually beneficial.
As said above, there's no way to impose a solution from the outside. However, if it were up to me, I would say that the only way to get to a solution is for both sides to be willing to give up something of great value to the other side. Probably the only thing left of value to the Palestinians--certainly the Gazans--is Hamas' intransigence towards Israel's very existence; they should be prepared to give that away, either through an ideological change or by removal of Hamas from the picture (peacefully, I hope, and not brutally). Such an offer would be of existential value to the Israelis.
For Israel's part, its current holding that is of great value to the Palestinians is the ability to nurture an independent Palestinian state, with all the territorial integrity that would come with statehood. Success might require that Israel give up some land that it now occupies. If the current Israeli government can develop enough foresight to see that this would be a small price to pay for existential security, then let them do it; if they cannot develop that foresight, then Israel needs a new government.
A message to the vast majorities of people on both sides in this conflict: Get yourselves some real leadership that thinks in terms of mutual respect and integrity; do so, and over time the feelings of being threatened and being insecure will go away. That means no more fighting, no more killing, no more destruction, no more lingering bitterness and misery. Finding the right kind of leadership might take some real effort, but the long-term benefits will make it all worthwhile.
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